holding, the Court reasoned that this procedure was necessary in light of the interests of the parolee
and to ensure the parolee received an adjudicator with “complete objectivity,” which a parolee’s
officer who recommended the revocation could not be expected to possess.262
V. THICKER IMPARTIALITY FOR STUDENTS FACING SCHOOL EXCLUSION
In light of the similarity of school discipline due process hearings to parole revocation
hearings in Morrissey, the standard of impartiality extended in that case should likewise be
extended to students facing long-term discipline by local school boards, consistent with principles
of constitutional procedural due process and long-held administrative law doctrines. Rather than
creating an “undue judicialization”263 of the school discipline process, the implementation of a
Morrissey-like impartiality standard in school discipline hearings would not be overly burdensome
to school districts. The acceptance of the standard by some forward-thinking state legislation
supports this notion and provides a starting point for provisions that would comport more fully
with due process.264
A. Extending Morrissey Protections to School Discipline Hearings
The parole board hearing and the student discipline contexts are similar; the articulated
function of parole that the Morrissey Court outlined as launching “the parolee into constructive
development,”265 parallels the hoped-for functions of school discipline, where the goal is not
simply to punish a student, but to restore the student to a readiness for education.266 The liberty
interests of parolees in Morrissey are also similar to the interests of students facing long-term
discipline in not being excluded from school erroneously. Like a parolee who is kept from
obtaining gainful employment, the freedom to be with family and friends, and the ability to enjoy
“the attachments of normal life,” students who face exclusion from school could reasonably suffer
future employment consequences.267 Students likewise face the loss of enjoyment of a “normal
life” for a person of their age, which includes both academic and social opportunities stemming
from attending mainstream public school, as well as the liberty interests associated with pursuing
opportunities limited by the stain of a disciplinary charge on the student’s record.268 Additionally,
just as society shares an interest in a parolee’s continued liberty, society shares an interest in a
student’s ability to remain in mainstream public education. Research strongly supports the
contention that society is benefited by an educated population,269 and this notion is maximized by
uninvolved person to make this preliminary evaluation for the basis for believing the conditions of parole have been
262 Id. at 486.
263 Gorman, 837 F.2d at 15.
264 See, e.g. D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 5-B § 2506.
265 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 478.
266 See Goss, 419 U.S. at 583 (discipline must remain “part of the teaching process”).
267 Goss explicitly recognized the deprivation of liberty interest stemming from educational and occupational
consequences of a student’s discipline record long before school-to-prison pipeline research began to take shape. Id.
at 575 (charges of misconduct, “if sustained and recorded…could seriously damage those students’ standing with their
fellow pupils and their teacher as well as interfere with later opportunities for higher education and employment”).
269 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221–22 (1982); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972). See also Hillel Y.
Levin, Tax Credit Scholarship Programs and the Changing Ecology of Public Education, 45 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1033,