In a case where the segregated facility is considered superior, the court should
determine whether the services which make that placement superior could be
feasibly provided in a non-segregated setting. If they can, the placement in the
segregated school would be inappropriate under the [Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975].81
The court further noted that cost was a “proper factor” to be considered, but could not be used as
a defense by a school district that had “failed to use its funds to provide a proper continuum of
alternative placements for handicapped children.”82
The Fifth Circuit rejected the Roncker test in Daniel R.R. v. State Board of Education83 as
too intrusive on local autonomy.84 Daniel R.R. also rejected an emphasis on educational benefit,
noting that nonacademic benefit must be considered.85 Accordingly, the Daniel R.R. court stated
that the determination of whether a school district has satisfied the mandate of providing an
education to a handicapped child in the LRE requires exploration of the following, nonexhaustive
list of factors: (1) “whether education in the regular classroom, with the use of supplemental aids
and services, can be achieved satisfactorily for a given child;” (2) “whether the school has
mainstreamed the child to the maximum extent appropriate;” (3) the child’s overall experience,
including non-academic benefits; and (4) the effect of the child on rest of the class either through
disruptive behavior or because the other students’ needs will be ignored because the child needs
excessive attention.86 The parties did not raise the issue of cost, but the court noted that cost may
properly be considered.87 The Daniel R.R. test quickly superseded the Roncker test.
The Eleventh Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in Greer v. Rome City School
District.88 The parents in Greer were intent on enrolling their child, who had Down Syndrome,
intellectual impairment, and communications deficits, in a general education program in their
community school.89 The school district was intent on enrolling the child in a specialized class at
a different school with inclusion in non-academic school activities.90 An independent evaluator
opined that the child would benefit from having peer models to imitate.91 Neither party suggested
placement in a regular classroom with related services and supports such as a resource room, an
itinerant special education teacher in the classroom and curriculum modification.92 The
administrative proceeding leading to the appellate level review was brought by the school district
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81 Id. at 1063.
82 Id.
83 Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1039. In Daniel R.R., the parents of a child with Down syndrome sought placement of their child in a
regular class. Id. at 1038–39. But the child “failed to master any of the skills being taught” in the regular class and suitable
modification would have changed the curriculum “almost beyond recognition.” Id. at 1039. Thus, placement of the child in a special
education class was upheld because the child failed to attain any benefit in the regular classroom, even with provision of supplemental
supports and services. Id. at 1046. The district court affirmed the IHO’s ruling in favor of the school district, which granted summary
judgment on the grounds that the child could not receive educational benefit in the regular program. Id. at 1046. The Fifth Circuit
affirmed, applying a different analysis that did not look to academic benefit, but to whether the district placement decision complied
with the mainstreaming preference. .Id. at 1050.
84 Id. at 1046; see also Keaney, supra note 14, at 835–36 (agreeing that integration is important, but that its efficacy is undermined by
teacher attitudes).
85 Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048.
86 Id. at 1048–49; see also L.B. ex rel. K.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 966, 976–77 (10th Cir. 2004).
87 Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 697 (11th Cir. 1991), withdrawn and remanded 967 F.2d 470 (11th Cir. 1992)
(remanding for determination of whether decision appealed from was a final order, resulting in consent order reflecting that all
pending issues had been resolved), reinstated 967 F.2d 470 (11th Cir. 1992).
88 Greer, 950 F.2d at 696.
89 Id. at 690–91.
