Children's Legal Rights Journal

Significantly, the prefrontal cortex is one of the last areas of the brain to fully develop, and continues to develop through late adolescence and into adulthood. 32 In other words, the regulatory abilities—or lack of regulatory abilities—susceptibility to peer influence, and poor decision making capabilities displayed by and observed in adolescents are grounded in the fact that their brains are still developing. 33

Based on this development research, the Court concluded that the differences between adults and juveniles are significant at the sentencing stage of the court process. 34 Recognizing that sentencing a juvenile to life without parole “improperly denies the juvenile offender a chance to demonstrate growth and maturity,” 35 demonstrates the Court’s increasing belief that juvenile development must be considered at sentencing. 36 The Graham Court’s ruling, that juveniles are amenable to treatment and capable of changing, is consistent with the long-standing juvenile court principle that youth, as a class, are “most in need of and receptive to rehabilitation.” 37

C. Miller v. Alabama – Declaring Mandatory Juvenile Life Without Parole Is Unconstitutional
Following in Graham’s footsteps, the Supreme Court in Miller held that a mandatory life
without parole sentence for those under the age of eighteen at the time of the crime is
unconstitutional. 38 In its analysis, the Court reaffirmed the conclusions in Roper and Graham,
based on new brain and social science research, “that children are constitutionally different from
adults for purposes of sentencing.” 39

Given the distinguishing characteristics of youth, the Miller Court concluded that theories of retribution, deterrence and incapacitation, as the purpose of adult sentencing, do not work within the juvenile context. Specifically, the Court found that retribution, based upon an offender’s blameworthiness, is not a convincing sentencing theory for minors, who are inherently less culpable than adults. 40 Similarly, the theory of deterrence does not work in the juvenile court context because “the same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults—their immaturity, recklessness, and impetuosity—make them less likely to consider potential punishment.” 41

Lastly, lifetime incapacitation, which is based on the decision that a “juvenile offender forever will be a danger to society,” requires a determination that the juvenile is “incorrigible,” a concept that “is inconsistent with youth.” 42 Rather, the sentencing rationale that works best in the context of juveniles is the theory of rehabilitation. 43 Grounded in the fundamental differences between adults and children, the Miller Court found that mandatory sentences of life without

32 Id. at 18, 23.

33 APA Brief, supra note 30, at 27 (“In short, the part of the brain that is critical for control of impulses and emotions and mature, considered decision-making is still developing during adolescence, consistent with the demonstrated behavioral and psychosocial immaturity of juveniles.”); AMA Brief, supra note 30, at 23-24.

34 See Levick et al., supra note 14 (“Given the sharp differences between juvenile and adult offenders, rote application of adult sentences will fail to pass constitutional muster.”).

35 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 73 (2010).

36 See Levick et al., supra note 14 (“The Court made clear that the juvenile must be given an opportunity to demonstrate the capacity to change—not only at the time of sentencing, but even over the course of time as he or she matures.”).

37 Andrea Wood, Comment, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Confining Juveniles with Adults After Graham and Miller, 61 EMORY L.J. 1445, 1481-82 (2012) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 74); see also Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012) (explaining that Graham and Roper added to the Supreme Court cases instituting “categorical bans on sentencing practices based on mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and the severity of a penalty”). “Several of the cases in this group have specially focused on juvenile offenders, because of their lesser culpability.” Id. (referring to Roper and Graham).