Evans later appealed his conviction and challenged the
constitutionality of Section 1591(a)(1), which discusses child sex
trafficking, and Section 2422(b), which addresses coercion of a
minor to engage in prostitution. Evans argued that the sections were
unconstitutional “as applied to his purely local actions and the
sufficiency of the stipulated facts to satisfy the jurisdictional
interstate-commerce elements of the offenses.”112 The Eleventh
Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed Evans’s conviction, holding
that despite all of Evans’s conduct taking place locally in Florida, his
activities satisfied the interstate commerce elements of both statutory
Regarding Evans’s conviction for child sex trafficking under
Section 1591(a)(1), the Eleventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals
explained the expansive scope with which the Supreme Court has
construed the power Congress maintains pursuant to the Commerce
Clause to regulate activities substantially affecting interstate
commerce.114 More specifically, “[t]he Supreme Court has
interpreted this power broadly to include the power to regulate purely
local activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”115 The appellate
court held that the “in or affecting interstate commerce” element of
the statute was satisfied because Evans’s enticement of the child to
commit prostitution, “even though his actions occurred solely in
Florida, had the capacity when considered in the aggregate with
similar conduct by others, to frustrate Congress’s broader regulation
of interstate and foreign economic activity.”116
Additionally, the court reasoned, “Evans’s use of hotels that
served interstate travelers and distribution of condoms that traveled
in interstate commerce are further evidence that Evans’s conduct
=old (last visited June 5, 2013).
112 See Evans, 476 F.3d at 1177.
113 Id. at 1178, 1181.
114 Id. at 1178.
116 Id. at 1179.